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A bankruptcy reorganization is a process for restoring financial
health to an insolvent corporation. The process normally requires a
reduction in the level of corporate debt, and it may also involve an
adjustment of the insolvent corporation's capital structure through
either an infusion of new capital or the conversion of a portion of the
corporation's debt to equity so that its former debt holders become
shareholders. Numerous cases and much academic commentary have
been devoted to the issue of whether former shareholders should be
permitted to receive stock in a reorganized corporation in return for
their contribution of new capital.'
There has also been considerable discussion of the form that the
contribution of new capital should take.2 The issue of the amount of
the new capital contribution has received little attention, but this issue
is probably more important than either the source or form of the capi-
tal contribution. Much of what has been written, both in the cases and
about them, derives from dictum by Justice Douglas in Case v. Los
Angeles Lumber Products Co.3 to the effect that a capital contribution
must be reasonably equivalent to the ownership interest received in
return for it.4 While superficially plausible, this standard turns out on
closer analysis to be merely a tautology.5 Under the absolute priority
rule,6 all of an insolvent corporation's value must be allocated to its
* Professor of Law, The University of Thlsa College of Law. I would like to thank Tom
Arnold, Dennis Bires, Lynn LoPucki, Bruce Markell, Jack Martin, Ali Mojdehi, Nick Rostow,
David Skeel, and Elizabeth Warren for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 49-68.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 71-83.
3 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
4 Id. at 121-22.
5 See Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorganiza-
tions, 44 STAN. L. REv. 69, 96-101 (1991).
6 The absolute priority rule was established by the Supreme Court in 1899. See infra note 45
and accompanying text.
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creditors;7 accordingly, any debt in excess of its value as a going con-
cern is discharged. When new capital is contributed, the Los Angeles
Lumber dictum will be satisfied automatically, because the only value
not allocated to the creditors is the new capital contribution.
Despite its vacuousness, the Los Angeles Lumber standard
continues to be recited by courts and commentators as the definitive
measure for the capital contribution required in a corporate reorgani-
zation. This Article develops a more useful standard based on the
feasibility requirement, which limits the confirmation of reorganiza-
tion plans to those that are not likely to be followed by either liquida-
tion or the need for further reorganization of the corporation.8
This Article begins with a review of the role of an equity cushion
in a solvent corporation's capital structure and the problems that can
arise in the absence of such an equity cushion. There follows a de-
scription of how the equity cushion of an insolvent company can be
restored through the reorganization process and why the corpora-
tion's former shareholders are often the best available source of capi-
tal for the new equity cushion. The Article then discusses the absolute
priority rule and whether its codification in the Bankruptcy Code,
without reference to the new capital exception, has eliminated the ex-
ception. Following this is a discussion of the limitations courts have
placed on the form of the capital contribution, and finally, the Article
analyzes how the courts should determine the amount of capital to be
contributed.
II. TH NEED FOR AN EQUITY CUSHION
The major controversy surrounding the Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion process today is whether it should continue to exist. A business
reorganization is time consuming and expensive. The insolvent corpo-
ration's assets have to be appraised and its liabilities determined, and
a reorganization plan must be submitted to all classes of shareholders
and creditors for approval and finally to the bankruptcy court for con-
firmation. The delay and expense of the reorganization process have
led a number of influential commentators to question the need for it9
7 See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) ("As the Court of
Appeals stated, the absolute priority rule 'provides that a dissenting class of unsecured creditors
must be provided for in full before any junior class can receive or retain any property [under a
reorganization] plan.' ") (brackets in original) (citation omitted).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
9 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 127 (1986); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11,
101 YALE LI. 1043 (1992).
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and to propose a number of market-based alternatives to Chapter l1's
combination of negotiation and adjudication.10
In a previous article," I explained how the reorganization process
provides a mechanism for resolving the conflicts of interest created by
a corporation's insolvency. By restoring an equity cushion in the cor-
poration's capital structure, the reorganization process can provide
shareholders and management with the appropriate incentives to op-
erate the enterprise efficiently. In many circumstances, the reorgani-
zation process may accomplish this result with fewer transaction costs
than the market-based alternatives.
A corporation is normally financed partly through equity and
partly through debt. Some equity is essential in a corporation's capital
structure to capture the residual interest in its future earnings.12 It is
possible for a corporation to have an all-equity capital structure, but
most corporations have substantial levels of debt financing. Besides
offering a tax benefit,13 debt in a corporation's capital structure pro-
vides leverage to shareholders, enabling them to earn a higher ex-
pected return, though at greater risk. The higher expected return may
be achieved if the corporation's expected earnings are greater than
the rate of interest on the debt; the increased risk results from the
accrual of interest at a fixed rate, which must be paid whether the
corporation's actual earnings prove to be large or small."4
Various costs are associated with the increased risk resulting from
debt financing. TWo of these are the potential costs of default on the
debt and agency costs arising from possible conflicts of interest be-
tween shareholders and creditors. If a corporation does not pay its
creditors, they may attempt to seize its assets to satisfy the debts, or
the corporation may have to file for bankruptcy protection. Either
way, the corporation is likely to suffer reduced revenues and incur
additional legal and accounting expenses. A conflict of interest can
arise between a corporation's shareholders and creditors because the
shareholders are entitled to its profits if the corporation succeeds,
10 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND Limrrs OF BANKRuPTcy LAW 218-24
(1986) (recommending sale of company as a going concern); Barry E. Adler, Financial and
Political Theories of American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1993) (proposing
issuance of "Chameleon Equity" instead of traditional debt); Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Ap-
proach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARV. L. RFv. 775, 785 (1988) (advocating the distri-
bution of options to shareholders and junior creditors to purchase shares in the reorganized
company); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt. A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REv. 527 (1983) (determining valuation by selling a portion of the reorganized com-
pany's stock in the market).
11 Charles W. Adams, An Economic Justification for Corporate Reorganizations, 20 HOF-
srRA L. REv. 117 (1991).
12 See 1 MODEL BusN ss CORP. Ace ANN. § 6.01 official comment (3d ed. 1993).
13 A corporation is allowed to deduct payments of interest to creditors, but not dividends
paid to shareholders. I.R.C. § 163 (West 1994).
14 For a numerical example, see Adams, supra note 11, at 119.
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while the maximum return for the creditors is the stated rate of inter-
est. If most of a corporation's capital structure is debt and the share-
holders have only a small amount of equity invested in it, the
shareholders will have an incentive to take excessive risks. The share-
holders have everything to gain if a risky venture succeeds and noth-
ing but their equity to lose if it fails.15 In contrast, the creditors can
continue to collect only their fixed interest payments if the venture is
successful, and they risk nonpayment of the principal if it is unsuccess-
ful. Although it may appear that shareholders benefit from leverage
at the expense of creditors, to the extent that creditors can anticipate
the use of leverage by shareholders, they will charge higher interest
rates in order to transfer the costs associated with leverage to the cor-
poration and its shareholders.
The potential costs of default and the agency costs associated
with leverage are normally held in check by the maintenance of a suit-
able equity cushion. An equity cushion represents the shareholders'
stake in the enterprise, and the presence of a sufficient equity cushion
insures that most of the risk is borne by the shareholders rather than
the creditors. A suitable equity cushion reduces the risks and, conse-
quently, the costs associated with debt financing.
An insolvent corporation has a capital structure that is pathologi-
cal. The capital structures of solvent and insolvent corporations are
diagrammed in Figure 1. Because liabilities already exceed asset
value, an insolvent corporation's shareholders have nothing more to
lose from further operating losses. Their main concern will be to have
the corporation earn a sufficient return so that it can become solvent
again. Because the shareholders bear none of the downside risk, they
will favor risky ventures with the potential for large gains over others
with more predictable, but smaller, gains.16 Until the corporation
achieves solvency, moderate gains will benefit only the creditors and
not the shareholders. Consequently, the shareholders will tend to fo-
cus on keeping the company afloat from day to day rather than on its
profitability over the long run. Although the corporation's creditors
lack direct control over management, they have various ways of en-
forcing their claims-such as garnishment of bank accounts and exe-
cution on corporate assets-that can disrupt corporate operations.
15 Of course, shareholders who have personally guaranteed payment of the debts of the cor-
poration will have more than their equity to lose in the event of default, and this will affect their
propensity for risk-taking. Guarantees from shareholders with substantial personal assets can
reduce creditor risk and provide a substitute for equity capital. For a discussion of the use of
shareholder guarantees as a form of capital contribution, see infra text accompanying notes 78-
91.
16 As noted earlier, shareholders who are subject to personal guarantees will have different
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Figure 1
Comparison of Capital Structures of a Solvent and Insolvent Corporation
Unfortunately, both creditors and shareholders of an insolvent
corporation lack incentives for maximizing its long-term interests.17
Insolvency generates destructive conflicts of interest between the cor-
poration's shareholders and creditors, with shareholders concentrating
on its short-term survival and creditors trying to collect on their claims
through seizure of the corporation's assets.18 A corporation cannot
operate effectively until these conflicts are resolved. Their resolution,
through the restoration of a sound capital structure, is the fundamen-
tal purpose of the bankruptcy reorganization process.19
III. CUREs FOR INSOLVENCY
In many cases, liquidation is a preferable alternative to reorgani-
zation. The causes of a corporation's insolvency may be a decline in
demand for its goods or services, or other insurmountable problems
that will prevent it from ever operating profitably. Reorganizing a
corporation's capital structure will not solve its economic problems,
and if a corporation has no prospects of achieving profitability, liqui-
dation should be ordered so that its assets can be put to better use
elsewhere.
17 Cf PIcNIPLEs OF CoRPoRATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01
(1994) ("[A] corporation. . should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.").
18 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. RIv. 669, 683-88 (1993)
(pointing out conflicts between senior and junior interests in insolvent corporations).
19 Adams, supra note 11, at 117-38, 157-58.
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That a corporation is experiencing financial distress20 does not
necessarily mean that it is not economically viable, however.21 Insol-
vency may have been caused by inadequate initial capitalization or a
particular economic problem that has been remedied. If so, reorgani-
zation of the corporation's capital structure may be economically justi-
fied as a means of preserving its going concern value. Liquidation
would be economically wasteful if an insolvent corporation were
worth more as a going concern than its assets were worth if sold sepa-











Liquidation of Insolvent Corporation
value over the liquidation value of a corporation's assets may be due
to a synergy among its tangible assets as well as the presence of intan-
gible assets that might evaporate in a liquidation, such as employee
know-how, a valuable corporate franchise or monopoly power, good
will, trademarks, or a net operating loss carryover.22 A corporate re-
organization would not be justifiable from an economic standpoint un-
less the corporation had a greater going concern value than
liquidation value. In addition, a bankruptcy court should consider the
costs of a reorganization in relation to the costs of liquidating the
20 See Robert Gertner & David Scharfstein, A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reor-
ganization Law, 46 J. FIN. 1189, 1190 (1991) (discussing the distinction between financial and
economic distress).
21 Cf Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bank-
ruptcy System, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 311, 325 (1982) ("Under some circumstances, it may be desira-
ble to permit and encourage the continued operation of an insolvent, unprofitable business.").
22 See I.R.C. § 172 (West 1994) (authorizing taxpayers to carry net operating loss deductions
back 3 years and forward 15 years).
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company's assets when evaluating whether to proceed with a Chapter
11 reorganization.2
Alternatives to reorganization may preserve an insolvent corpo-
ration's going concern value. For example, it may be possible to avoid
the expense and delay of the Chapter 11 process by arranging a
workout or a private restructuring of the corporation's debt.24 A pri-
vate restructuring may not be successful, however, if there are numer-
ous classes of debt,25 particularly if any of them are subject to the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939,26 which requires unanimous consent of
bondholders to any change in the principal amount, interest rate, or
maturity date of a bond indenture.27 Another option that some com-
mentators have urged is the sale of an insolvent corporation as a going
concern.28 There are typically significant transaction costs associated
with such a sale, however, such as underwriter fees and other charges
for arranging financing, and these could exceed the costs of the reor-
ganization process. 29 Similarly, other alternatives that have been sug-
gested may be inferior to the Chapter 11 reorganization process
because they involve high transaction costs or have other
shortcomings.30
Whatever mechanism is employed, its main objective should be
reestablishing an equity cushion to neutralize the potential conflict of
interest between the corporation's shareholders and creditors and to
reduce the interest cost of debt financing. The sources of this equity
cushion are discussed in the next Part.
IV. FORMER SHAREHOLDERS AS A SOURCE OF NEW CAPrrAL
There are three potential sources of capital for an equity cushion
in a reorganized corporation: its creditors, its shareholders, and
23 See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 18, at 753-67 (comparing problems and
costs of liquidation and reorganization).
24 See Gertner & Scharfstein, supra note 20, at 1189-1222; Stuart C. Gilson et al., Troubled
Debt Restructurings: An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firms in Default, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 315 (1990).
25 Gilson, supra note 24, at 345.
26 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (1988).
27 See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.i. 232 (1987)
(urging repeal of the provision prohibiting modification of bond indenture terms except by unan-
imous consent).
28 JACKSON, supra note 10, at 209-24; Baird, supra note 7, at 127.
29 See Adams, supra note 11, at 146 (reporting that SEC studies show the average cost of
flotation for underwriting common stock offerings was 12.43% of the gross proceeds); Douglas
G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 633, 641-47 (1993) (comparing both
direct and indirect costs of reorganization to costs of initial public offerings); LoPucki & Whit-
ford, supra note 18, at 765 ("When the fees of the investment banker are considered, the cost of
liquidating under chapter 7 may exceed the cost of reorganizing under chapter 11.").
30 Adams, supra note 11, at 148-57.
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outside investors.31 First, the necessary capital may come from the
corporation's creditors by means of a conversion of their debt into
equity. This is illustrated in Figure 3.
No
Equity
Assets • Liabilities Assets Equity
(Valued as (Converted debt)
agoing i i
Asses F] Labiltie AsetsLiabilities
Figure 3
Reorganization By Converting Some Debt to Equity
The insolvent corporation's stock is retired, the portion of debt
that exceeds the corporation's going concern value is discharged, and
the creditors are issued new stock and debt in the reorganized corpo-
ration. The discharge of some of the debt and the conversion of an-
other part into stock produces the equity cushion needed to cure the
insolvency. The major disadvantage of this approach to reorganiza-
tion is that it may not be feasible for some creditors to become equity
owners of the reorganized corporation. Banks are a major source of
debt financing, for example, and the Glass-Steagall Act32 imposes sig-
nificant restrictions on their ownership of common stock.3 3 In the ab-
sence of an active market for the stock in the reorganized corporation,
banks and creditors with preferences for debt would have difficulty
disposing of the stock. Even if there were an active market for the
stock, the creditors would incur transaction costs, such as broker's
commissions, to sell the stock. Therefore, issuing stock to creditors
31 Outside investors could include managers and other corporate employees.
32 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1988) (prohibiting national banks from purchasing stock in corporations).
33 See 12 C.F.R. § 225.22(c)(1)(i) (1993) (allowing bank holding companies to hold voting
securities if they are acquired in the ordinary course of collecting a debt and they are divested
within two years of acquisition); see also 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) (prohibiting state member banks
of the Federal Reserve System from purchasing stock in corporations); FREDERICK K. BETrrEL
& MILTON R. SCHROEDER, BANK OFFmCER'S HANDBOOK OF COMMERCIAL BANKINo LAw §§ 4-
30, 5-30 (5th ed. 1982).
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who then sell it is less efficient than having the purchasers buy the
stock directly from the reorganizing corporation.
Outside investors are an alternative source of new capital for the
equity cushion. Again, the insolvent corporation's old stock is retired,
and the portion of debt that exceeds the corporation's going concern
value is discharged. The outside investors are then issued all the stock
in the reorganized corporation in return for new capital contributions,
and their ownership interest constitutes the equity cushion, as dis-
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Reorganization Though Outside Investment
probable difficulty of finding outside investors to contribute capital to
the insolvent corporation.
A significant disadvantage to obtaining equity cushion capital
from either creditors or outside investors is that these approaches of-
fer no benefit to the existing shareholders of the insolvent corpora-
tion, whose stock is retired and who lose control in the reorganized
corporation. In many cases, the existing shareholders may be familiar
with the business operations and involved in managing of the corpora-
tion; thus, the reorganized corporation may be disadvantaged by the
loss of their association with it 4 Of course, if that is so, the corpora-
tion's new owners (whether they are the former creditors or outside
34 See In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899, 916 (9th Cir. 1993), cert granted, 114 S. Ct.
681, dismissed as moot, 115 S. Ct. 386 (1994) (denying motion to vacate court of appeals decision
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investors) may offer the former shareholders compensation to con-
tinue their involvement with the corporation.3 5
A more serious problem with these approaches is that neither of-
fers shareholders any reason to initiate the reorganization process.
The decision to file a Chapter 11 proceeding is normally made by a
corporation's board of directors36 rather than the shareholders, but
directors generally perceive an obligation to act in the interest of the
shareholders. If the directors and shareholders have no reason to file
a reorganization proceeding, they will be inclined to seek delay and to
take increasingly risky gambles hoping that solvency will be restored
eventually through some financial miracle. This is likely to lead to
further financial deterioration, until recovery is no longer possible.3 7
To be sure, the insolvent corporation's creditors have an incentive to
file involuntary Chapter 11 proceedings in order to maximize their
recovery. However, initiating an involuntary proceeding is difficult
and risky for creditors,38 and creditors generally lack immediate ac-
cess to the corporation's financial information.
35 Baird, supra note 7, at 141 ("[Tjhe managers' expertise and the need to compensate them
for it exists regardless of whether or not managers have ownership interests in the firm. Giving
stockholders shares in the reorganized company cannot be justified on the ground that it ensures
continued participation of the managers. If the owners as a group want the managers to stay
with the firm, they can pay them in cash, stock, or some other way. Compensating them, how-
ever, should have nothing to do with dividing rights to the firm among the existing owners.").
See also Victor Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifications" of the Abso-
lute Priority Rule, 48 AM. BANKR. LJ. 304,336 (1974) ("If the stockholders are not synonymous
with management, whatever the latter may be entitled to, the former are entitled to nothing
unless they contribute money or 'money's worth reasonably equivalent to the participation ac-
corded' to them (Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 122 (1939)).").
36 See In re Moni-Stat, Inc., 84 B.R. 756,757 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988) ("[T]he law is clear that
the decision of whether or not a corporation should file bankruptcy is a business decision to be
made only by the board of directors.").
37 See generally LoPucki, supra note 21, at 312 ("In all but a few cases, the meaningful stages
of financial decay, recovery or liquidation occur outside the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy
court deals not with businesses in financial difficulty, but with their skeletons, already picked
clean by workouts, state court proceedings, informal liquidations, or merely the ravages of time
and poor management.").
38 Where a debtor has more than 12 creditors, 3 creditors with claims that are "not contin-
gent as to liability or the subject of a bona fide dispute" must join in an involuntary petition. 11
U.S.C. § 303(b) (1988). If the debtor opposes the involuntary petition, the creditors must prove
at a trial either that "the debtor is generally not paying such debtor's debts as such debts become
due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute" or else that a custodian has taken
charge of substantially all the debtor's property. Id. Proving that the debtor is "generally" not
paying its debts, as opposed to proving that it is not paying particular debts, is difficult for credi-
tors, who usually will not know whether the debtor is paying its other creditors, because they do
not have access to the debtor's books. If the creditors fail to establish grounds for an involuntary
proceeding, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees against them, and in appropriate
cases, compensatory and punitive damages. Filing an involuntary proceeding can cause substan-
tial harm to a debtor, and so significant restrictions on creditors are appropriate. However,
these restrictions do limit the use of involuntary proceedings. See generally Douglas G. Baird,
The Initiation Problem In Bankruptcy, 11 Irr'L REv. L. & ECON. 223 (1991) (giving managers
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An additional justification for the participation of the former
shareholders in the reorganized corporation is that the shareholders
may be the best source of new capital. Many years ago, counsel for
the reorganized railroad in Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd39 ex-
pressed this point well:
[B]etween 1892 and 1900, a large number of the railroad companies of
the United States, by their necessities, were forced to submit to foreclo-
sure. They have been succeeded by a system of vigorous, solvent, pros-
perous and useful corporations. The change, obviously to the public
advantage, was the result of reorganizations so-called, of which almost
all were based upon plans similar to that involved in the present case.
The principle of such plans was that financial necessities of the physical
properties could be met only by sufficient and prompt provision of addi-
tional cash capital for the new corporation; and that for prompt and suf-
ficient cash provision the most available source was and would be those
who already were acquainted with the physical property and would have
faith in its future possibilities. Manifestly these were, and must continue
to be, those who had been interested in the old company, either as bond-
holders or stockholders, and not necessarily or probably those who were
its general creditors.4°
Over the years since Boyd, there has been persistent pressure to
find some way for the insolvent corporation's shareholders to be in-
cluded in the reorganized corporation. Several decades ago, a number
of influential commentators advocated what is known as the relative
priority rule,41 which would permit the level of debt to be scaled down
to issue new stock in the reorganized corporation to the former share-
holders. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The relative priority rule ran
counter to basic principles of corporate law,42 however, and it was
control of the initiation of bankruptcy is economically justified in many cases); Elizabeth War-
ren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MicH. L. REv. 336, 369-70 (1993) (ex-
plaining that a debtor is usually in the best position to decide when to initiate bankruptcy).
39 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
40 Id. at 495 (argument for Appellant).
41 See, e.g., James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority
Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 127 (1928); E.
Merrick Dodd, Jr., The Securities and Exchange Commission's Reform Program for Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 38 COLuM. L. Rv. 223, 235-36 (1938); Harry G. Guthmann, Absolute Priority
in Reorganization: Some Defects in a Supreme Court Doctrine, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 739 (1945);
Robert T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade, 27
COLUM. L. REv. 901 (1927).
42 See 1 MODEL BusNEss CORP. Acr ANN. § 6.40(c)(2) (3d ed. 1993) (stating that distribu-
tions to shareholders are not allowed if they would cause the corporation's total assets to be-
come less than its total liabilities plus an amount needed to satisfy any preferential claims of
preferred shareholders); 2 MODEL Businass COR. Acr AN. § 87(b) (2d ed. 1971) (stating that,
upon dissolution, a corporation must satisfy its liabilities before distributing any remaining assets
among its shareholders); Walter J. Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganization,
17 U. Cm. L. REv. 565, 581 (1950) ("In theory the contractual priorities affecting the rights of
creditors and shareholders are to be recognized in full. Senior claimants are supposed to be
completely compensated, which includes being given equitable compensation for loss of any val-
89:411 (1995)
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Figure 5
Reorganization Using the Relative Priority Rule
soon rejected by the Supreme Court43 in favor of its converse, the
absolute priority rule, which requires satisfaction of the claims of cred-
itors in full before the shareholders can receive anything in a
reorganization.
A variation of the relative priority rule was one of the recommen-
dations made by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States in its 1973 report to Congress44 that proposed sweeping
revisions of the bankruptcy laws. Ultimately Congress rejected the
uable rights, before junior claimants are permitted to receive anything of value."); see also UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER Act § 5, 7A U.L.A. 657 (1985) (stating that a transfer is fraudulent as
to existing creditors if the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer and it was made while the debtor was insolvent, or the debtor became insolvent as a
result of the transfer).
43 Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N.A. & C. Ry., 174 U.S. 674, 684 (1899) ("[T]he stock-
holder's interest ... is subordinate to the rights of creditors; first of secured and then of un-
secured creditors. And any arrangement of the parties by which the subordinate rights and
interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of
either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation.").
44 The Commission's Report stated in part:
The Commission recommends that:
1. The fairness test be modified (a) by substituting for the unqualified "fair and equita-
ble" criterion, Le., "absolute or strict priority", a test that precludes participation by junior
interests where the going concern value does not cover senior interests, but easing the evi-
dentiary basis for the valuation of the business; (b) allowing another look after the facts are
in, and (c) by allowing equity security interests to participate if their future contributions,
e.g., continued management, are essential to the business.
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 258 (1973).
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Commission's recommendation, though, and instead adopted a form
of the absolute priority rule as part of the current Bankruptcy Code.45
The Bankruptcy Code's absolute priority rule is qualified: it ap-
plies only if there is a class of unsecured creditors that is impaired
under the reorganization plan and has not accepted the plan by the
requisite majority in number of creditors and two-thirds in the dollar
amount of claims.46 Thus, a reorganization plan may be confirmed
without the unanimous consent of the creditors. 47 This gives the pres-
ent reorganization process an important advantage over workouts and
informal negotiations outside the bankruptcy forum, where unani-
mous consent is required.48 Still, it is not always possible to obtain
acceptance from each class of unsecured creditors, particularly if a
substantial number of the creditors is convinced that the Bankruptcy
Code's absolute priority rule guarantees full payment of their claims
before the shareholders are entitled to receive any share in the reorga-
nized corporation.
Without an exception to the absolute priority rule, a plan would
have to be accepted by each class of unsecured creditors to be con-
firmed. Unless acceptances from all classes could be obtained, the re-
organization would fail and the creditors could wind up receiving less
45 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202 (1988) ("The [absolute priority]
rule ... was incorporated into Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code adopted in 1978." (citation
omitted)). Section 1129(b)(1) of Chapter 11 provides that if a plan has not been accepted by
each class of claimants, it must be "fair and equitable" with respect to each class of claims that is
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (1988). Section
1129(b)(2)(B) then states that in order to be "fair and equitable" the plan must satisfy the fol-
lowing requirement:
With respect to a class of unsecured claims-
(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or retain on
account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the
allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class will not
receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1988).
46 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126,1129(a)(8), (b)(1) (1988); see also Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of
a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 301, 326 (1982) ("[T]he fair and
equitable requirement survives in [S]ection 1129(b), but that situation applies only where con-
sent of at least one impaired class has not been obtained.").
47 The Bankruptcy Code has therefore partially overruled Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939), in which the Supreme Court reversed the confirmation of a
reorganization plan that had been approved by more than 90% of the creditors. Id. at 115 ("[I]n
this case the fact that 92.81% in amount of the bonds, 99.75% of the Class A stock, and 90% of
the Class B stock have approved the plan is as immaterial on the basic issue of its fairness as is
the fact that petitioners own only $18,500 face amount of a large bond issue.").
48 See Varouj A. Aivazian & Jeffrey L. Callen, Corporate Leverage and Growth, 8 J. FIN.
ECON. 379, 397 (1980) ("In an informal reorganization, all claimants must agree or be compen-
sated. One can readily envisage small bondholders or shareholders threatening to abort the
reorganization unless they are fully compensated. These threats are far less effective in a formal
reorganization since the Bankruptcy Act [sic] requires that only two-thirds agreement (by face
value of the claims) need be obtained for the reorganization.") (footnote omitted).
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in liquidation than they would have received under the plan. The ab-
solute priority rule could thus be detrimental to the interests of the
very unsecured creditors it was designed to protect. To avoid such a
perverse result, attorneys and courts have sought an alternative that
would allow shareholders to participate in the reorganized corpora-
tion without having to satisfy all the claims of creditors.
V. THE SOURCE OF THE NEW CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
The principal means by which shareholders have tried to partici-
pate in the reorganized corporation is by contributing new capital
through the purchase of stock.49 This has been called the "new capital
exception" to the absolute priority rule. To support the exception, at-
torneys and judges have pointed to dictum from the Supreme Court
decision in Los Angeles Lumber:50
It is, of course, clear that there are circumstances under which stockhold-
ers may participate in a plan of reorganization of an insolvent debtor.
This Court ... indicated as much in Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Boyd ...
and Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v. Central Union Trust Co .... Espe-
cially in the latter case did this Court stress the necessity, at times, of
seeking new money "essential to the success of the undertaking" from
the old stockholders. Where that necessity exists and the old stockhold-
ers make a fresh contribution and receive in return a participation rea-
sonably equivalent to their contribution, no objection can be made. But
if these conditions are not satisfied the stockholder's participation would
run afoul of the ruling of this Court in Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Central Union Trust Co ....
... [W]e believe that to accord "the creditor his full right of priority
against the corporate assets" where the debtor is insolvent, the stock-
holder's participation must be based on a contribution in money or in
49 Professor LoPucki has made the following observations:
Debtors' attorneys quickly discovered means of circumventing the absolute priority
rule, most employing variations of one basic scheme. The debtor asserts that it has insuffi-
cient cash to continue operations and cannot raise the necessary cash by borrowing. (The
assertion is usually true, although the owners may have maneuvered the debtor into that
position deliberately.) The debtor then proposes to obtain the necessary working capital by
sale of an interest in the business to "new investors." In fact the new investors are either the
shareholders themselves or others who are associated with the shareholders in some man-
ner. The new investment is contingent upon confirmation of a plan which pays unsecured
creditors less than the full amount of their claims and gives ownership and control to the
new investors. The bankruptcy courts generally hold that the absolute priority rule does not
apply in these circumstances because the shareholders are retaining their ownership on ac-
count of the new investment and not "on account of (their) junior ... interest."
LYNN M. LoPuciu, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRuvrcY PROCEEDINGS 415 (1985).
50 308 U.S. 106.
Bankruptcy Reorganizations
money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the circumstances to
the participation of the stockholder.51
When the absolute priority rule was codified in the Bankruptcy
Code in 1978,52 it contained no reference to a new capital exception,
and a number of courts have questioned whether the new capital ex-
ception survived that enactment.5 3 In Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers54 the United States, as amicus curiae, urged the Supreme
Court to rule that the Bankruptcy Code had extinguished the new
capital exception to the absolute priority rule.55 The Court declined
to reach this question, finding that its resolution was not essential to
the dispute before it, since the capital contribution in the plan under
review was not adequate under the Los Angeles Lumber standard.
The Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have similarly
avoided reaching the question whether the new capital exception re-
mains viable by determining that the particular capital contributions
under review were inadequate.5 6
In In re Greystone III Joint Venture,57 the Fifth Circuit initially
held that Congress had eliminated the new capital exception by codi-
fying a strict absolute priority rule.58 However, on rehearing, the
panel withdrew the portion of its opinion that dealt with the new capi-
tal exception.59 A dissent 60 hinted that the withdrawal was prompted
by the intervening decision in Dewsnup v. Timm,61 in which the
Supreme Court (in a somewhat different context) 62 expressed a reluc-
51 Id. at 121-22 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1988).
53 E.g., In re Bryson Properties, XVIII, 961 F.2d 496, 503 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he courts are di-
vided as to whether codification of the absolute priority rule in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) tolled a death
knell for the [new capital] exception.") (footnote omitted), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992);
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Whether
the 'new value exception' to the absolute priority rule survived the codification of that rule in
1978 is a question open in this circuit.").
54 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
55 ld. at 203-04 n.3.
56 In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e follow our prior deci-
sions and again reserve ruling on the viability of the new value precept until another day.");
Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[W]e hold that as in
Ahlers, this case does not require us to reach the issue of whether the 'new value exception'
continues to exist.").
57 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 72 (1992).
58 ld. at 1283.
59 Id at 1284.
60 Id. at 1285. See also Michael J. Thomerson, The Status of the New Value Exception to the
Absolute Priority Rule After Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 97 CoM. LJ. 457, 469-70
(1992) (stating that Ahlers dissent and a commentator believe withdrawal was due at least in part
to the decision in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct 773 (1992)).
61 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
62 Dewsnup was concerned with whethei a debtor in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding
could strip down a creditor's lien on real property to the value of the collateral.
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tance to interpret the Bankruptcy Code as effecting a major change
from pre-Code practice unless there was some legislative history to
support the change. 63
The Ninth Circuit relied in part on Dewsnup in In re Bonner Mall
Partnership64 to conclude that the new value exception had not been
abolished by the failure of Congress explicitly to enact it in the Bank-
ruptcy Code.65 The Ninth Circuit also reasoned that permitting for-
mer owners to receive stock in a reorganized corporation did not
violate the absolute priority rule if their receipt of stock was not "on
account of" their prior ownership interests, but rather given in return
for their contributions of new value. 66 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Bonner Mall67 to resolve the issue it failed to reach in
Ahlers.68 Before the Court could decide the issue, however, the par-
ties settled the case, rendering it moot.69
Although the Bonner Mall settlement prevented the Court from
addressing the new value exception's survival, this issue will surely
come back to the Court again.70 When it does, the Court should rec-
ognize the exception, because an insolvent corporation's former own-
ers are often the only feasible source of new capital, and their
contributions should be encouraged, rather than barred. In addition,
the Court should require the form and amount of the capital contribu-
tions to be sufficient to fulfill the purpose of the Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation process by restoring financial health to the reorganized
company.
63 112 S. Ct. at 779.
64 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681, dimissed as moot, 115 S. Ct. 386
(1994) (denying motion to vacate court of appeals decision after the case becomes moot by
voluntary settlement).
65 l at 912-13.
66 Id. at 908-09. See also Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURV.
Am. L. 9, 39 ("By its own language, the absolute priority rule limits old equity's participation in
the post-reorganization business only to the extent that old equity claims a share of the estate
based on its pre-bankruptcy equitable ownership. The Code does not prohibit old equity from
becoming a post-petition financer of the business or a post-plan owner of the business.").
67 U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994).
68 The question for which the Supreme Court originally granted review was: "Did new value
exception to absolute priority rule survive enactment of 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act, permit-
ting debtor in Chapter 11 bankruptcy case to confirm nonconsensual plan of reorganization that
allows debtor's equityholders to retain ownership of reorganized debtor while paying objecting
creditors less than full amount of their claims?" 62 U.S.L.W. 3441 (Jan. 11, 1994).
69 After the settlement, the creditor who objected to the reorganization plan moved to va-
cate the Ninth Circuit's decision. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonnner Mall Partnership, 114
S. Ct. 1367 (1994). In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court denied the motion. U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 115 S. Ct. 386, 393-94 (1994).
70 See In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The question will in
all probability ultimately be decided by the Supreme Court."), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681
(1994).
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VI. THE FORM OF THE NEW CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
Although the Supreme Court refused to resolve the issue of the
new capital exception's existence in Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers,71 it did rule on the form required for a capital contribution if
the exception were to be recognized. Following Los Angeles Lum-
ber,72 the Supreme Court held that capital contributions would have
to be in the form of "money or money's worth" if they were to come
within a new capital exception to the absolute priority rule.
In Los Angeles Lumber, the reorganization plan called for contri-
butions from the reorganizing corporation's former shareholders that
consisted merely of their "financial standing and influence in the com-
munity" and their providing "continuity of management." 73 While ap-
pearing to recognize the new capital exception, the Court held that
these intangibles were not adequate consideration for the issuance of
stock in the reorganized corporation, saying: "On the facts of this
case they cannot possibly be translated into money's worth reasonably
equivalent to the participation accorded the old stockholders. They
have no place in the asset column of the balance sheet of the new
company. They reflect merely vague hopes or possibilities." 74
The reorganization plan in Ahlers called for "yearly contributions
of labor, experience, and expertise" 75 from the owners of a farm. As
in Los Angeles Lumber, the Supreme Court decided that these contri-
butions of future services were not sufficient to justify an exception
from the absolute priority rule. It reasoned:
Viewed from the time of approval of the plan, respondents' promise of
future services is intangible, inalienable, and, in all likelihood, unen-
forceable. It "has no place in the asset column of the balance sheet of
the new [entity]." Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 122-23. Unlike
"money or money's worth," a promise of future services cannot be ex-
changed in any market for something of value to the creditors today. In
fact, no decision of this Court or any Court of Appeals, other than the
decision below, has ever found a promise to contribute future labor,
management, or expertise sufficient to qualify for the Los Angeles Lum-
ber exception to the absolute priority rule. 6
The form of contribution analyzed by the Seventh Circuit in
Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank77 was a shareholder
guarantee of a loan to the reorganizing corporation.78 The plan of
reorganization provided for the corporation's former shareholders to
71 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
72 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
73 Id. at 122.
74 Id. at 122-23 (footnote omitted).
75 485 U.S. at 201.
76 Id. at 204 (emphasis in original) (brackets in original) (footnote omitted).
77 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990).
78 Id. at 1362-63.
89:411 (1995)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
retain ownership of the corporation in return for their guaranteeing
new loans to finance the reorganization. Relying on Ahlers and Los
Angeles Lumber, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the guarantees could
not constitute new value for purposes of satisfying a new capital ex-
ception to the absolute priority rule.7 9 Judge Easterbrook's opinion
for the court pointed out that guarantees are not balance-sheet assets;
instead, they are intangible, inalienable, and unenforceable, because
there is no way for a corporation to prevent shareholders from revok-
ing their guarantees or rendering them valueless by disposing of their
assets.80 It also noted that if the shareholders were organizing a new
corporation in Illinois, they could not issue stock to themselves in re-
turn for guarantees of loans, because Illinois law restricts the consider-
ation for new shares to money, property, or past services. 8' The court
also distinguished its own earlier decision, In re Potter Material Ser-
vice, Inc.,82 on the ground that the shareholder in that case had con-
tributed cash in addition to guaranteeing a substantial loan, while the
guarantees were the only contributions that the shareholders in Kham
& Nate's Shoes were making.83
The Seventh Circuit made a useful comparison in the Kham &
Nate's Shoes decision between the form of new capital contributions
in the corporate reorganization context and the form of capital contri-
butions required as consideration for the issuance of stock under gen-
eral corporate law. For many years, the trend in corporate law has
been toward increasing liberalization of the form of allowed capital
contributions. Cash was at first the only form of consideration al-
lowed for the purchase of shares, but early in the history of corpora-
tions, property regarded as "money's worth" became an acceptable
substitute for cash. After 1850, services that had already been per-
formed were recognized as a permissible form of consideration.84
This was the scheme of the Model Business Corporation Act in 1969:
The consideration for the issuance of shares may be paid, in whole or in
part, in money, in other property, tangible or intangible, or in labor or
services performed for the corporation ....
Neither promissory notes nor future services shall constitute pay-
ment or part payment for the issuance of shares of a corporation.85
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act adopted in 1984 broad-
ened the allowable consideration to "any tangible or intangible prop-
erty or benefit to the corporation, including cash, promissory notes,
79 Id. at 1362.
80 1d. at 1362-63.
81 1&. at 1362.
82 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
83 908 F.2d at 1362.
84 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACr ANN. § 6.21 history (3d ed. 1989); 1 MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACr ANN. § 19 comment (2d ed. 1971).
85 1 MODEL BusINESs CORP. Acr ANN. § 19 (2d ed. 1971).
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services performed, contracts for services to be performed, or other
securities of the corporation." 86 The Official Comment explains:
Section 6.21(b) specifically validates contracts for future services (includ-
ing promoters' services), promissory notes, or "any tangible or intangible
property or benefit to the corporation," as consideration for the present
issue of shares. The term "benefit" should be broadly construed to in-
clude, for example, a reduction of a liability, a release of a claim, or
benefits obtained by a corporation by contribution of its shares to a
charitable organization or as a prize in a promotion. In the realities of
commercial life, there is sometimes a need for the issuance of shares for
contract rights or such intangible property or benefits. And, as a matter
of business economics, contracts for future services, promissory notes,
and intangible property or benefits often have value that is as real as the
value of tangible property or past services, the only types of property
that many older statutes permit as consideration for shares. Thus, only
business judgment should determine what kind of property should be
obtained for shares, and a determination by the directors meeting the
requirements of section 8.30 to accept a specific kind of valuable prop-
erty for shares should be accepted and not circumscribed by artificial or
arbitrary rules.87
The Supreme Court's insistence in Los Angeles Lumber and
Ahlers that new capital contributions must be "money or money's
worth" appears to be out of step with the liberal trend reflected in the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act. On the other hand, this
may well be justified in the peculiar context of Chapter 11, where a
debtor is seeking confirmation of a reorganization plan over the ob-
jection of at least one impaired class of creditors.88 A corporation that
has already experienced insolvency is inherently riskier than the aver-
age corporation, and so its creditors may be entitled to greater solici-
tude from the bankruptcy court, which may properly require more
tangible forms of new capital to make up the equity cushion.
Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to construe the Los Angeles
Lumber and Ahlers cases so rigidly as to exclude all forms of intangi-
ble property. For example, if allowed as consideration for new shares
under the applicable state corporate law,89 a promise of future serv-
86 1 MODEL BusINEss CORP. Acr ANN. § 6.21 (3d ed. 1989).
87 Ld. § 6.21 official comment.
88 Cf. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1362 ("Promises inadequate to support the issuance
of shares under state law are also inadequate to support the issuance of shares by a bankruptcy
judge over the protest of creditors, the real owners of the firm.").
89 Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and
defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason
why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved
in a bankruptcy proceeding. Uniform treatment of property interests by both state and federal
courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent
a party from receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.' ") (cita-
tion omitted).
89.411 (1995)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ices might appropriately be allowed as a new capital contribution,90
particularly if arrangements (such as placing the shares in escrow) 91
could be made to assure that the promised services are forthcoming.
Similarly, had Illinois law permitted a guarantee to constitute allowa-
ble consideration for the issuance of new shares, and had there been
some way to quantify the guarantee's value to the reorganizing corpo-
ration, Kham & Nate's Shoes might have come out differently.
VII. THE AMOUNT OF THE NEw CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION
Although there has been considerable concern expressed in the
cases about the source and form of a new capital contribution in a
plan of reorganization, there has been relatively little analysis of the
amount of new capital necessary to finance a reorganization. In Case
v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,92 the Supreme Court stated that
"the stockholder's participation must be based on a contribution in
money or in money's worth, reasonably equivalent in view of all the
circumstances to the participation of the stockholder." 93 Because the
shareholders' contribution in that case was not "in money or in
money's worth," it was not in the proper form, and the Court did not
need to decide whether it was "reasonably equivalent" to the value of
the equity the shareholders were to receive under the plan. Thus, the
Court's statement concerning the magnitude of the new capital contri-
bution was not part of its holding. Nevertheless, numerous courts
have adhered to the Supreme Court's dictum that the new capital con-
tribution must be reasonably equivalent to the value of the interests in
the reorganized corporation that the contributing shareholders will
receive.94
90 Most states continue to follow Section 19 of the Model Business Corporation Act (1969)
and prohibit the issuance of shares in exchange for promises of future services. See 1 MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. § 6.21 annot. at 370-71 (3d ed. 1989); see also, ag., COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 7-4-105(2) (1986) ("The promise of future services shall not constitute payment or part pay-
ment for shares of a corporation."); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 504(b) (McKinney 1986) ("Neither
obligations of the subscriber for future payments nor future services shall constitute payment or
part payment for shares of a corporation.").
91 See 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. § 6.21(e) (3d ed. 1989), which provides:
The corporation may place in escrow shares issued for a contract for future services or
benefits or a promissory note, or make other arrangements to restrict the transfer of the
shares, and may credit distributions in respect of the shares against their purchase price,
until the services are performed, the note is paid, or the benefits received. If the services
are not performed, the note is not paid, or the benefits are not received, the shares escrowed
or restricted and the distributions credited may be cancelled in whole or part.
The escrow arrangements should include protection against the possibility of the corporation's
waiving the escrow terms to the detriment of creditors.
92 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
93 Id. at 122.
94 See, e.g., In re Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 141 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[T]here is a judge-made excep-
tion to the absolute priority rule: the debtor can retain an interest in the bankrupt estate ahead
of his creditors to the extent that he puts new capital into the estate. So if he contributes $50,000
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The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Potter9 5 illustrates how the Los
Angeles Lumber standard has been applied. Under the proposed plan
of reorganization, all stock in the insolvent corporation was to be can-
celed, the unsecured creditors were to receive three percent of their
allowed claims, and the sole shareholder was to be issued all the stock
in the reorganized corporation in return for: (1) contributing $14,800
to the corporation to fund the payments to the unsecured creditors,
(2) paying the allowed compensation to the debtor's attorneys in an
amount estimated at $20,000, and (3) renewing a personal guarantee
of a $600,000 loan to the debtor. The bankruptcy court confirmed the
debtor's plan over the objection of the unsecured creditors on the
ground that the shareholder's contribution was substantial and ex-
ceeded the going concern value of the firm, which the court concluded
was between $10,000 and $15,000.96 No explanation was offered re-
garding how the bankruptcy court determined the corporation's going
concern value, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed because there was no
showing that the bankruptcy court's determination was erroneous. 97
While most commentators have accepted the Los Angeles Lum-
ber standard uncritically,98 John Ayer 99 and Bruce Markell ° have
pointed out that it is fundamentally unsound. The problem with the
standard is that it Will always be satisfied whenever the corporation's
pre-reorganization going concern value is allocated entirely to its
creditors, as is required under the absolute priority rule. 01 As Profes-
sor Markell notes, rather than placing limits on the new capital excep-
tion to the absolute priority rule, the Los Angeles Lumber standard
"merely rephrases the ... rule."'12
in cash to the bankrupt enterprise, he can retain an interest worth $50,000 .. "); In re Ashton,
107 B.R. 670, 674 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989) ("[T]o retain property to the exclusion of the un-
secureds the contribution must at least equal the interest being retained."); In re Aztec Co., 107
B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (finding that the new capital exception was satisfied
because the "new investment is far in excess of the value of the interests that the venturers will
retain in the debtor"); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) ("[T]he contribu-
tion must be reasonably equivalent to the value of the interest to be retained. This is self-
explanatory.").
95 781 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1986).
96 Il at 102.
97 ld. at 103-04.
98 See, e.g., John T. Bailey, The "New Value Exception" in Single-Asset Reorganizations: A
Commentary on the Bjolmes Auction Procedure and Its Relationship to Chapter 11, 98 COM. LJ.
50, 53 (1993); Linda J. Rusch, The New Value Exception to the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter
11 Reorganizations: What Should the Rule Be?, 19 PEP. L. REv. 1311, 1333-35 (1992); Warren,
supra note 66, at 43.
99 See John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REv. 963, 1012-
19 (1989).
100 See Markell, supra note 5.
101 ld. at 98 ("[A]ny contribution of money or money's worth permits owners to retain owner-
ship so long as creditors receive property equal to the debtor's reorganization value.").
102 Id. at 101.
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In order to repair an insolvent corporation's capital structure
through the reorganization process, its liabilities must first be written
down to the going concern value of the corporation's assets. As a
result, the going concern value of the corporation's assets net of its
remaining liabilities becomes zero. The going concern value of the
corporation's assets net of liabilities cannot be greater than zero, be-
cause if it were, the creditors would be entitled to the excess as a re-
sult of the absolute priority rule. Indeed, the only justification for
reducing the corporation's liabilities in the reorganization process is
the fact that they exceed the going concern value of the corporation's
assets; if they did not, the creditors would be entitled to have their
claims satisfied in full. A contribution of new capital to the reorganiz-
ing corporation causes its going concern value net of its liabilities to
increase precisely by the amount of the contribution. Since the contri-
bution will always be equivalent to the corporation's going concern
value net of liabilities, 0 3 the amount of the capital contribution that is
required in the reorganization process cannot be determined from the
corporation's going concern value.104
The indeterminacy of the Los Angeles Lumber standard may be
demonstrated with a numerical example. Consider the balance sheet
of a corporation that initially has assets with a going concern value of
$1 million and liabilities of $3 million. Writing down the liabilities to
$1 million (the going concern value of the assets) would yield a net
going concern value of zero. If a shareholder or other investor were
to make a capital contribution of $200,000 after the writing down of
the liabilities, the going concern value of the corporation's assets after
the contribution would be $1.2 million and its net going concern value
would be $200,000. This is illustrated below.
Professor Ayer is correct in pointing out that a reorganizing cor-
poration's going concern value net of its liabilities must be zero, but
he is mistaken when he goes on to contend that this means there is no
basis for a new capital exception to the absolute priority rule.105 He
claims that a rational shareholder would never agree to contribute
new capital to an insolvent corporation that is undergoing reorganiza-
tion, and if one did, the fact that the shareholder was offering to con-
tribute new capital would itself be an "admission" that the
reorganizing corporation's net going concern value was really more
than zero. If the reorganized corporation did have a positive going
103 See id. at 116 n.278 ("If full reorganization value is to be returned to creditors, then the
contribution by the debtor will equal, at least on an accounting basis, the total net worth of the
reorganized debtor.").
104 See In re Jartran, Inc., 44 B.R. 331, 379 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) ("Inasmuch as the share-
holders' equity is valueless, any contribution by [a shareholder] will necessarily be equal to or
greater than the value of its 100% ownership interest.").








Assets $1,000,000 Liabilities $1,000,000
Shareholder
Contribution 200,000 Equity 200,000
Total $1,200,000 $1,200,000
concern value, the reorganization plan could not be confirmed unless
all the creditors received full payment. 106
Professor Ayer's latter argument brings to mind the story about
the student who tells a finance professor that there is a twenty-dollar
bill lying on the ground; the professor responds that if the bill really
were there, someone else would already have picked it up.107 Even
though a reorganizing corporation's net going concern value is zero, it
may nonetheless offer a profitable investment opportunity for a prior
shareholder. Moreover, there may be other reasons (economic as well
as noneconomic) for a former shareholder to be willing to pay a pre-
mium for continued ownership. 08
A shareholder's contribution of new capital does not vanish after
it is made; instead, it increases the going concern value of the reorga-
nized corporation. Consequently, it is not irrational for an investor to
make a capital contribution to a corporation that has a net going con-
cern value of zero. The increase in going concern value resulting from
the infusion of new capital may be even larger than the capital contri-
bution, and if that is so, the contributing shareholder will earn a profit
from the investment. In addition, over time the active participation of
former shareholders may contribute even more to the corporation's
106 Professor Ayer writes:
Given that no one would pay $10 for a company with a net worth of zero, then the offer
of a $10 payment has to be taken as an "admission" that the company is worth more than
[the amount the court found was the going concern value of the corporation's assets]. But if
it is worth more than [the court's finding of the going concern value], then [the creditor's]
secured claim is undervalued, and [the creditor] is not being fully compensated on that se-
cured claim. That being the case, cram-down is not available, and the plan may not be
confirmed.
The same logic forbids confirration at any valuation until [the creditor] either (a) con-
sents or (b) receives full value for its claim.
Ayer, supra note 99, at 1014.
107 See Martin Shubik, Corporate Contro4 Efficient Markets, and the Public Good, in
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPAcr OF THE Hos-nLE TAKEOVER 31, 33 (John C.
Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
108 See Markell, supra note 5, at 100 (tax benefits, sentimentality); Warren, supra note 66, at
21-22 (continued employment, "psychic income," and connection to other businesses).
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going concern value, particularly if they are involved in the corpora-
tion's management or operations.
Professor Ayer concludes that because the size of the new capital
contribution cannot be determined from the corporation's going con-
cern value, there is no basis for a new capital exception to the absolute
priority rule.10 9 His conclusion does not follow, though, because there
may be other criteria by which courts may determine the appropriate
size for the new capital contribution.
One requirement that a number of courts have imposed is that
the new capital contribution must be necessary to the reorganiza-
tion.110 By definition, an insolvent corporation needs new capital in
order for its solvency to be restored. Because this requirement will
always be satisfied, it does not provide any guidance as to the amount
of the capital contribution that will be sufficient for reorganization.
Another criterion that several courts have applied is that a new
capital contribution must be "substantial.""' For example, the Sev-
enth Circuit said in Potter that "[t]he new capital investment must (1)
represent a substantial contribution and (2) equal or exceed the value
of the retained interest in the corporation. 11 2 The court failed to
specify any standard for evaluating whether a capital contribution is
substantial, however; it merely ruled that the bankruptcy court's find-
ing of a substantial contribution was not erroneous.113
109 Ayer, supra note 99, at 1012 (1989) (stating that "new value may have been an illusion all
along-or less dramatically, there may never have been an adequate doctrinal basis for the new
value rule").
110 See, e.g., In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[A]n infusion of new capital
must be necessary to the success of the undertaking."); In re S.A.B.T.C. Townhouse Ass'n, Inc.,
152 B.R. 1005, 1010 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) ("The second requirement of the 'new value excep-
tion' is that the contribution must be necessary to the Debtor's reorganization effort."); In re
F.A.B. Indus., 147 B.R. 763, 769 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (new value must be "necessary for an effective
reorganization"); In re Batten, 141 B.R. 899, 908 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1992) ("In order to qualify
under the exception, debtors must first show the necessity for the capital infusion."); In re Mort-
gage Inv. Co., 111 B.R. 604, 620 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) ("The capital infusion exception may
only be used in those instances where the capital is necessary for the continued operations of the
debtor.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
Ill See, e.g., In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The requirement that a contri-
bution be substantial is independent of the rule that a contribution must be at least equal to the
value of the interest retained."); In re F.A.B. Indus., 147 B.R. 763, 769 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (new
value must be substantial); In re Batten, 141 B.R. 899, 908 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1992) (to qualify
under the new value exception the capital "must be substantial"); In re SLC Ltd. V, 137 B.R.
847, 855 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992) ("One element courts have applied to valuation is whether the
contribution is substantial."); see also In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 995 F.2d 1274, 1283 (5sh
Cir. 1991) (proposed test for new value exception includes requirement that it be substantial)
(withdrawn on rehearing), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992); Markell, supra note 5, at 95 n.166
(criticizing the substantiality requirement).
112 In re Potter Material Service, Inc., 781 F.2d 99, 101 (7th Cir. 1986).
113 Id at 103.
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Some courts 1 4 and commentators"1 5 have interpreted this last
criterion to mean that the capital contribution must be more than a
mere token amount. While it is clear that a capital contribution must
be greater than a trifle, this is a feeble standard for assessing the suffi-
ciency of a capital contribution. The primary gauge that courts have
used to measure whether a capital contribution is substantial is the
amount of prepetition debt that will be discharged under the plan.116
Comparing the capital contribution to the amount of prepetition debt
may have some validity, because the amount of liabilities that the in-
solvent corporation accumulated in the past may be some indication
of its future capital needs.
Rather than dwelling on the debtor's liabilities from the past,
though, a bankruptcy court should look to its future prospects. This
was the approach taken by Judge Altenberger in In re Snyder,117
where he explained:
It seems clear that in establishing the exception the Supreme Court was
requiring a contribution of new money in an amount essential to the
success of the reorganization. So another consideration is whether the
... cash contribution is sufficient to bring about a successful reorganiza-
tion. Stated another way, will the contribution give the Debtors the fi-
nancial strength to complete the Plan?118
The most appropriate standard for a new capital contribution is
whether it provides an adequate equity cushion.119 The price that the
114 See In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he proposed token
cash infusion does not constitute 'new value' and violates the absolute priority rule."); In re
Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Contributions that are merely nominal or 'gratui-
tous, token cash infusions proposed primarily to "buy" cheap financing,' will not suffice."); In re
Stegall, 865 F.2d 140, 144 (7th Cir. 1989) (nominal contribution would not be sufficient).
115 See Warren, supra note 66, at 43 (stating that, to be substantial, the contribution "must be
something more than nominal").
116 See In re Woodbrook Assocs., 19 F.3d 312, 320 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court
decision that the proposed capital contribution was not substantial because it constituted only
3.8% of the total amount of unsecured debt); In re Olson, 80 B.R. 935, 937 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1987) ("Inasmuch as the application of the exception involves the relationship of the Debtors to
the dissenting class, one factor to be considered is the amount of the contribution compared to
the amount of unsecured debt due to the dissenting class."); In re Pullman Constr. Indus., Inc.,
107 B.R. 909, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[T]o gauge whether or not the [shareholders'] contribution is
'substantial', the Court must compare the contribution to the total pre-petition claims and the
amount of debt to be discharged under the Plan."); In re Ruby Debruycker Ranch, Inc., 84 B.R.
187, 190 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) ("The cash contributions, while allowing the Debtor [sic] to
retain their equity, pales into the 'de minimus' category, even if one were to accept the excep-
tions of Case is [sic] allowable under the absolute priority rule. In other words, the capital con-
tribution must certainly result in a 100% pay out of unsecured creditors, which is not proposed
under the Plan."). But see In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1992) ("We cannot say that
the determination as to whether an infusion of new capital is 'substantial' will always hinge on a
comparison to the total amount of unsecured debt.").
117 105 B.R. 898 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 967 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992).
118 Id. at 903.
119 I am indebted to my colleague M. Thomas Arnold for this insight.
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new owners of a reorganized corporation should be required to pay
for control following the reorganization is neither the going concern
value (which will be zero if the assets are valued correctly and the
absolute priority rule is applied) nor the amount of liabilities to be
discharged. Instead, the rule should require the new owners to put up
a sufficient stake in the enterprise to absorb any future losses that can
reasonably be anticipated. 120
Absolute protection for a corporation's creditors is not attaina-
ble. No business is entirely risk-free, and there is always some possi-
bility of future losses to creditors that cannot be eliminated with any
finite amount of equity capital. Although creditors cannot expect to
receive absolute protection, they can be shielded from most risks of
loss through the maintenance of an adequate cushion of equity. An
adequate cushion provides owners with appropriate incentives to
maximize the long-term value of the corporation, whether the equity
cushion comes from outside investors or from former shareholders.
The equity cushion needs to be large enough not only to keep the
potential conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors to a
minimum, but also to absorb any fluctuations in earnings that can rea-
sonably be anticipated. Otherwise, there is a significant risk of an-
other insolvency, and the reorganization will have been for naught.121
To protect the corporation's existing and future creditors from
another insolvency, the feasibility requirement in Section 1129(a)(11)
of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a bankruptcy court should con-
firm a reorganization plan only if confirmation "is not likely to be
followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorgani-
zation, of the debtor."'122 This requirement has long been a part of the
law of bankruptcy reorganizations. Section 221(2) of the former
120 See Snyder, 105 B.R. at 904 ("[Tjhe purpose of requiring a contribution of new capital is to
help provide financial strength to complete the plan."); cf. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d
899, 916 n.38 (9th Cir. 1993) ("If old equity contributes a substantial amount of new capital to
the business undergoing reorganization, then the risk of a later failure falls more heavily on
stockholders than creditors."), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681, dismissed as moot, 115 S. Ct. 386
(1994); Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority
and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1051-52 (1987) ("With the contribution, the
former owners, undertake a risk of increased loss. In return, they retain control as well as an
opportunity to benefit from market and valuation factors."); Warren, supra note 66, at 43 ("[The
rule that the contribution must be substantial] evidently functions to assure that there is not only
a purchase in form, but also in substance-that the DIP [debtor in possession] is putting up
something more than a token amount for the control and going-concer value.").
121 See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Reorganization Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 48
HARv. L. REv. 1100, 1102 (1935) ("The first essential of a workable reorganization plan is that it
shall, so far as is possible, provide the reorganized enterprise with a capital structure and cash
resources which will give it a reasonable chance of financial rebirth as a solvent going concern.").
122 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988). See Markell, supra note 5, at 116 n.78 (explaining that
the feasibility requirement provides a test for whether the capital contribution is sufficient for
the reorganized corporation to be able to thrive).
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Bankruptcy Act included a similar requirement' 23 from which Section
1129(a)(11) was derived. 24 To determine whether a plan satisfies the
feasibility standard, courts usually look at whether there is a reason-
able prospect that the reorganization plan will succeed. 125 While the
adequacy of a debtor's capital structure is often listed as one of the
factors used in analyzing a plan's feasibility,126 the bankruptcy courts
have tended to concentrate on the accuracy of the plan's income pro-
jections,127 instead of on the need for the owners of the reorganized
corporation to have a significant stake in the enterprise.
The feasibility requirement cannot be satisfied if the reorganized
corporation is so thinly capitalized that it is unable to withstand some
future losses. An all-equity capital structure would provide the largest
possible equity cushion, but most corporations operate satisfactorily
with substantial levels of debt.128 Debt increases risk, but the reorga-
nized corporation obtains offsetting benefits from the tax advantages
and leverage that debt financing provides. And subject always to the
stability of the expected earnings for the reorganized corporation, the
risk of insolvency following reorganization can be held to an accepta-
ble level by maintaining an adequate equity cushion.
A variety of factors may potentially influence a corporation's cap-
ital structure. These include the corporation's profitability, the uni-
queness of its products, the degree of specialization of its equipment
and its employees, and the extent of equity ownership by its manage-
123 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1976) (repealed 1978) (providing in pertinent part: "[t]he judge shall
confirm a plan if satisfied that.., the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible").
124 S. Rap. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5914 (stating in pertinent part: "Paragraph (11) requires a determination regarding feasibility of
the plan. It is a slight elaboration of the law that has developed in the application of the word
'feasible' in Chapter X of the present Act.").
125 See, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636,649 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he feasibility
standard is whether the plan offers a reasonable assurance of success. Success need not be
guaranteed.").
126 See, eg., In re U.S. Truck Co., 800 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Landing Assocs.,
Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 819 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); In re Landmark at Plaza Park, Ltd., 7 B.R. 653,
659 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1980).
127 See, e.g., In re SM 104 Ltd., 160 B.R. 202,234-39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); see also DAVID
G. EPTiN Er AL, BANKRuvrcy 759 (1993):
How does the debtor establish feasibility? It does so through business projections, and by
putting the chief financial officer, accountants, business consultants or other experts on the
witness stand to explain why a new and sunny day is dawning. Business projections are
inexact at best, and creditors can easily cast doubt on feasibility by challenging the debtor's
assumptions and by presenting their own skeptical witnesses.
128 Robert A. Taggart, Jr., Secular Patterns in the Financing of U.S. Corporations, in CoRxo-
RATE CAPITAL STRuruREs IN THE UNrTED STATES 13,16-17 (Benjamin M. Friedman ed., 1985)
(noting a dramatic increase in the debt-to-asset ratio for U.S. corporations between 1937 and
1979).
89:411 (1995)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ment.129 However, the primary factor affecting a corporation's capital
structure is generally the volatility of its earnings. A number of stud-
ies have shown, for example, that corporations in regulated industries,
which tend to have stable earnings, have the highest proportions of
debt, while pharmaceutical and electronics manufacturers, which tend
to have the most volatile earnings, have the smallest proportions of
debt.130
In evaluating whether a proposed capital contribution is sufficient
to absorb future losses, a bankruptcy court should look at the capital
structures of other corporations in the same industry. The volatility of
earnings depends on the type of business in which a corporation is
engaged, and consequently, corporations in the same industry tend to
have similar capital structures.' 3 ' The capital structures of other cor-
porations in the same industry can therefore provide a gauge for mea-
suring the adequacy of the proposed equity cushion in the reorganized
corporation.132
Surprisingly, when reviewing the adequacy of capital contribu-
tions, the courts have generally been oblivious to the need for an eq-
uity cushion to provide financial stability in the reorganized
corporation. For example, in affirming Judge Altenberger's decision
in In re Snyder, the Seventh Circuit relied on the disparity between
the contribution and the amount of unsecured debt that the corpora-
tion had before the reorganization, 3 3 rather than on whether the re-
organized corporation had a suitable capital structure. A comparison
of the magnitude of the capital contribution to the unsecured debt is
of little use in assessing the adequacy of the contribution, because the
fundamental purpose of the reorganization process is to restore a sta-
ble capital structure to the corporation, rather than to repay its former
creditors. Repaying the former creditors might be a desirable end, but
a corporation's shareholders have no such obligation under the lim-
129 See Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, 46 J. FlN. 297, 337-40
(1991) (summarizing theoretical and empirical'studies of the effect these and other factors have
on a corporation's capital structure).
130 Id. at 333-35.
131 Michael Bradley et al., On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evi-
dence, 39 J. FIN. 857, 869 (1984) ("[A]lmost 54% of the cross-sectional variance in firm leverage
ratios can be explained by industrial classification. There is more variation in mean leverage
ratios across industries than there is in firm leverage ratios within industries.").
132 Cf Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597, 607-09 (1993) (finding that compa-
nies emerging from reorganizations tended to have higher debt to equity ratios than companies
of comparable size in the same businesses).
133 The court decided that the proposed capital contribution was insubstantial because it
amounted to only 2.7% of the total unsecured debt and 3.3% of what was owed to the principal
creditor. In re Snyder, 967 F.2d 1126, 1131 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ited liability rule. 3 4 All the creditors are entitled to receive is the
going concern value of the corporation's assets, and without a success-
ful reorganization, all they would receive is the liquidation value of
the assets. The capital contribution goes not to the creditors, but
rather to the reorganized corporation, and so the size of the capital
contribution should have nothing to do with the amount of liabilities
that are discharged in the reorganization process.
The lack of concern shown by bankruptcy courts for an adequate
capital structure is exemplified by In re Bjolmes Realty Trust.135 The
debtor was a Massachusetts business trust whose principal asset was a
fifteen-unit apartment building. The trust owned the building subject
to a $380,000 first mortgage loan, but the building's value had declined
to approximately $250,000. Including the unsecured portion of the
mortgage, the debtor had about $167,000 of unsecured debts. The
debtor's plan of reorganization called for payment of the $250,000 se-
cured claim over a twenty-five-year period at a rate of interest to be
set by the court, and payment of a ten percent dividend to the un-
secured creditors at the time of confirmation. In addition, the un-
secured creditors would receive a second mortgage on the building,
which would be paid without interest when the building was sold or
refinanced. The source of the ten percent dividend for the unsecured
creditors was to be a $17,000 contribution from the trust's former
shareholders. In exchange for the $17,000 contribution, the trust's for-
mer shareholders would receive all the stock interests in the reorga-
nized trust.136
The proposed capital structure of the reorganized trust in
Bjolmes Realty is obviously defective. Rather than going to create an
equity cushion, the capital contribution would be paid immediately to
the unsecured creditors. Because the portions of the unsecured claims
that were not satisfied would not be discharged upon confirmation,
the reorganized trust would remain insolvent under the debtor's pro-
posed plan. Although the unsecured claims would not be payable im-
mediately, they would remain as liabilities secured by the second
mortgage on the building. Because the shareholders of the reorga-
nized trust would continue to have negative equity, they would face
no downside risk and would not have the appropriate incentives to
manage its operations effectively.
The bankruptcy court refused to approve the debtor's plan with-
out two revisions,137 neither of which addressed the plan's fundamen-
134 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corpora-
tion, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 89 (1985).
135 134 B.R. 1000 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). See also Bailey, supra note 98, at 65-77 (praising
the approach taken in this case).
136 134 B.1. at 1001.
137 id. at 1010-11.
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tal defect. Instead of accepting the proposed $17,000 contribution
from the trust's former shareholders, the court required an auction to
be held among the trust's shareholders and creditors, with the credi-
tors being allowed to bid for the equity in the reorganized trust. All
the proceeds from the auction would be used to pay a dividend to the
unsecured creditors, however, so there would still be no equity cush-
ion in the reorganized trust. The second revision was to eliminate the
second mortgage for the unpaid portion of the unsecured creditor's
claims. Although the court's opinion was not explicit, it appears that
the unpaid portion of the unsecured creditor's claims was to be dis-
charged upon confirmation. Thus, under the bankruptcy court's plan
of reorganization, the reorganized trust would not be insolvent right
away. Nevertheless, its capital structure would still be deficient be-
cause it would consist entirely of debt.
Another inadequately capitalized plan of reorganization was con-
firmed by the bankruptcy court in In re Greystone III Joint Venture. 38
The debtor owned an office building in Austin, Texas with an ap-
praised value of $5.8 million. Its major creditor held a nonrecourse
promissory note secured by a first lien on the building and was owed
$9.3 million, which left an unsecured deficiency claim of $3.5 million.
The plan provided for the debtor's former partners to contribute
$500,000 in return for all the equity interest in the reorganized part-
nership, and from this contribution approximately $100,000 (or about
three cents on the dollar) would be paid to the creditor on account of
its deficiency claim.139 Only $400,000 would remain as an equity
cushion.
In contrast to the Bjolmes Realty plan, the Greystone plan did
provide an equity cushion for the reorganized partnership, because a
portion of the new capital contribution was to remain in the partner-
ship rather than being immediately paid to creditors. Nevertheless,
the reorganized business was too thinly capitalized to satisfy the feasi-
bility requirement of Section 1129.140 There are a number of factors
that affect the size of a real estate loan,141 but most lenders require a
seventy-five percent loan-to-value ratio.142 An appropriate equity
138 102 B.R. 560 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989), rev'd, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 72 (1992).
139 995 F.2d at 1277; 102 B.R. at 561.
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
141 In addition to the property's value, lenders normally consider the amount of income and
expenses as well as the cash flow from the property in evaluating the size of a loan. See generally
M.A. HINES, REAL ESTATE DEBT FINANCING 153-68 (1987) (describing criteria used by lenders
in making loans); JOHN P. WIEDEMER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE 260-64 (3d ed. 1980) (same).
142 John B. Levy, Regulations Prompt Higher Minimum Spreads, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR,
Mar. 1993, at 24 ("Since the beginning of the commercial mortgage business, lenders have im-
posed a 75% loan-to-value limit as being prudent. This real estate recession has unfortunately
shown that even that level of leverage was too aggressive. As a result, a number of survey
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cushion for the creditor's secured claim of $5.8 million might therefore
have been in the neighborhood of $1.5 million, instead of the $400,000
that was called for in the reorganization plan.
The plan under review in Bonner Mall 143 also appears deficient.
The Bonner Mall debtor's primary asset was a shopping mall in Idaho,
which the bankruptcy court valued at $3.2 million. The debtor's prin-
cipal liability was a loan of $6.6 million, secured by a deed of trust
against the mall. The debtor's plan provided for repayment of the
secured portion of the loan ($3.2 million) thirty-two months after con-
firmation, with interest payable monthly in the interim. Unsecured
creditors with claims greater than $1,000 would receive a pro rata dis-
tribution of 300,000 shares of $1.00 par value preferred stock in the
reorganized corporation, convertible to a maximum of 300,000 shares
of common stock upon payment of the secured portion of the loan.
The debtor's six former partners were to contribute a total of $200,000
and receive two million shares of common stock in return. In addi-
tion, the plan called for the partners to subsidize any shortfall in work-
ing capital during the first thirty-two months after confirmation of the
plan, and for five of the former partners to contribute a collateral trust
mortgage on other property as a guarantee of the debts that were as-
sumed by the reorganized corporation. 144
It should be apparent that this plan would not satisfy the feasibil-
ity requirement of Section 1129. Even though the reorganized corpo-
ration would not be immediately insolvent, the common shareholder's
equity interest would be under water after the issuance of the 300,000
shares of $1.00 par value preferred stock to the corporation's former
unsecured creditors. Because the reorganized corporation would have
only a $200,000 equity cushion and the preferred shareholders would
have a liquidation preference, the common shareholders would not be
entitled to any profits until the $100,000 impairment of capital result-
ing from issuance of the preferred stock was cured. Consequently,
there would be a potential conflict of interest between the common
and preferred shareholders built into the capital structure of the reor-
ganized corporation. Moreover, the issuance of the preferred shares
would be contrary to the stated capital requirements of the applicable
Idaho law.145
members are now requiring that their commercial mortgages meet a 65% loan-to-value test or
less."). Cf. FED. RESERVE BuLL, Sept. 1993, at A37 (reporting that loan-to-value ratios for
mortgages on new homes ranged from 74.8% to 79.5% between 1990 and June 1993).
143 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681, dismissed as moot, 115 S. Ct. 386
(1994) (denying motion to vacate court of appeals decision after the case became moot by volun-
tary settlement).
144 Id at 905.
145 See IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1-18, 30-1-21 (1980) (prohibiting the issuance of shares for less
than their par value).
89:411 (1995)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
The Bonner Mall plan was also deficient because of the size of the
equity cushion. Applying the seventy-five percent loan-to-value stan-
dard,146 the equity cushion for the secured creditor's $3.2 million claim
should be close to $1 million, rather than the $200,000 provided by the
reorganization plan. The plan also called for the former partners to
subsidize any shortfall in working capital and to guarantee the pay-
ment of the reorganized corporation's debts with a collateral trust
mortgage. Depending on the circumstances, these guarantees might
have sufficient value to compensate for the lack of a more substantial
cash contribution. However, they would not be allowed as considera-
tion for the issuance of new shares under applicable Idaho law' 47 and
thus should not be considered part of the equity cushion of the reorga-
nized corporation.
When the case reached the Ninth Circuit, the court held that the
new value exception to the absolute priority rule had survived the en-
actment of the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore, the plan was not un-
confirmable on account of the source of the capital contribution. The
court added that it was unclear whether the plan satisfied all the re-
quirements for the exception, so it remanded the case to the bank-
ruptcy court for a ruling with respect to these requirements. 148 The
bankruptcy court never had a chance to rule, however, because while
the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the parties reached a
settlement and agreed to an alternative reorganization plan, which the
bankruptcy court confirmed. 149 In contrast to the previous plan, the
plan arrived at by the parties through negotiation expressly provided
for an adequate equity cushion. Under the confirmed plan, the for-
mer partners would contribute not only guarantees, but also addi-
tional real property as collateral upon which the creditor would
receive liens. The confirmed plan further provided for the creditor to
obtain appraisals for the mall and the other collateral, and that if the
appraisals showed that the loan-to-value ratio was more than sixty-
five percent, the former partners committed themselves to contribute
additional collateral to reduce the loan-to-value ratio to sixty-five per-
cent or less.150
Although there may not be any precise formula for determining
an ideal capital structure for a reorganized corporation, in many cases
146 See supra note 142.
147 See IDAHO CONST. art. XI, § 9 ("No corporation shall issue stocks or bonds, except for
labor done, services performed, or money or property actually received; and all fictitious in-
crease of stock or indebtedness shall be void."); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-19 (1980) ("The considera-
tion for the issuance of shares may be paid, in whole or in part, in cash, in other property,
tangible or intangible, or in labor or services actually performed for the corporation.").
148 Bonner Mall, 2 F.3d at 918.
149 See In re Bonner Mall Partnership, No. 91-00801, 1994 WL 249619, at *1a (E.D. Wash.
Mar. 10, 1994) (order confirming Chapter 11 plan).
150 See id. at *18a-19a (third amended plan of reorganization).
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a bankruptcy court can be reasonably certain that a capital structure
proposed in a plan under review is inadequate. For example, it is clear
that a corporation should not be allowed to emerge from the reorgani-
zation process with inadequate shareholder equity, as the plans in
Bjolmes Realty and Greystone proposed. For closer cases, the bank-
ruptcy court may need expert testimony from a financial analyst con-
cerning the adequacy of capitalization and possibly also from a lender
as to the debtor's ability to borrow the debt specified in the plan from
an informed outside source.151 The court might also require the reor-
ganization plan to include contractual restrictions to prevent the reor-
ganized corporation from paying out the equity cushion in dividends
after confirmation.152
VIII. CONCLUSION
The fundamental purpose of a corporate reorganization is to re-
pair an insolvent corporation's capital structure by restoring its equity
cushion. The restoration of the equity cushion defuses the conflicts of
interest that the insolvency created between the corporation's share-
holders and creditors. In deciding whether to confirm a plan of reor-
ganization, bankruptcy courts must evaluate whether the plan
provides an adequate equity cushion in the reorganized corporation;
otherwise, the fundamental purpose of the reorganization process will
have been ignored.
For the most part, bankruptcy judges and lawyers have not paid
any attention to the adequacy of equity cushions proposed in reorgan-
ization plans. Instead, they have concentrated on whether the capital
contributions to finance the reorganization came from the corpora-
tion's former shareholders or from outside investors and on whether
the capital contributions were tangible property or not. In general,
however, the size of the capital contributions is more critical than
either its source or form. Perhaps the lack of attention to the size of
the equity cushion grew from the misleading dictum in Los Angeles
Lumber. The Supreme Court's dictum has a superficial validity: capi-
tal contributions from former shareholders must be reasonably
equivalent to the ownership interests they receive in return. This stan-
dard provides inadequate guidance, though, because if the corpora-
tion's assets are fairly valued and the absolute priority rule is applied,
even a nominal capital contribution would satisfy the Los Angeles
Lumber standard. A nominal capital contribution is not sufficient for
151 See In re Mobile Steel Co., 563 F.2d 692,703 (5th Cir. 1977) (listing methods for determin-
ing the adequacy of capitalization in equitable subordination cases); see also LoPucki & Whit-
ford, supra note 132, at 607-09 (comparing debt to equity ratios of companies emerging from
reorganization with ratios for companies of comparable size in the same business).
152 For an example of a covenant restricting distributions to shareholders, see BAYLEss MAN-
NING & JAMEs HANKs, LEGAL CAPITAL 105-12 (3d ed. 1990).
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a successful reorganization, however. The courts should therefore re-
ject the Los Angeles Lumber dictum and instead evaluate plans of
reorganization according to whether they provide an adequate capital
structure for the reorganized corporation.
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